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Export Trade Certificates of Review: Will
Efficacy be Permitted?
John A. Maher*
Nancy J. LaMont**
I. Introduction
The ice-breaking Export Trading Company Act of 19821 is misleadingly captioned. It has five discrete thrusts.' Only one is concerned with organization of trading companies and even those companies are not limited to export trade!3 Explicit congressional
* Professor, The Dickinson School of Law; A.B. 1951, University of Notre Dame; LL.B.
1956 & LL.M. (Trade Regulation) 1957, New York University.
** Partner, Messrs. Meyer, Unkovic & Scott, Pittsburgh, Pa.; B.A. 1974, Allegheny
College; J.D. 1978, The Dickinson School of Law.
Ms. LaMont and Prof. Maher are co-authors, together with Dennis Unkovic, Esq., of
International Opportunities & the Export Trading Company Act of 1982 (BNA 1984). The
authors acknowledge the many contributions of Linda T. Cox, Esq., J.D. 1984, The Dickinson
School of Law and Patricia M. Wilson, cand. J.D. 1985, The Dickinson School of Law.
I. Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (Title I
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003; Title 11 codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 635a-4, 1843(c)(14),
372; Title Ill codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26, 4011-4021; and Title IV codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 7, 45(a)(3)) [hereinafter referred to as ETCA].
2. ETCA Title II, given an independent short title of the Bank Export Services Act
(BESA), serves three purposes: (1) to encourage availability of working capital loans to exporters through an Export-Import Bank guaranty program; (2) to promote availability of
bankers' acceptances in finance of exports and imports; and (3) to permit commercial banks'
equity investment in trading companies exclusively engaged in international trade but principally oriented to U.S. exports. ETCA Title Ill provides an administrative mechanism through
which certain persons can obtain a Certificate of Review (COR) providing significant personal
immunity from prosecution under antitrust and other federal and state laws for export-related
activities described in the COR. ETCA Title IV, also given the independent short title of the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, erected a steep subject matter jurisdiction test to be met by those prosecuting non-importing conduct in international commerce
under either the Sherman Act or the portion of § 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act (FTCA) which proscribes "unfair methods of competition." This Article does not discuss
BESA, the procedural aspects of procuring and maintaining a COR, or ETCA Title IV. For
greater detail on those topics, see D. Unkovic, J. Maher & N. LaMont, International Opportunities & The Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 37 C.P.S. (BNA) (1984).
3. The type of trading company in which banks can have equity investments is defined
at BESA § 203(3), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(14)(F)(i) (1982). It is not limited to exporting.
Rather, it looks to enterprises "exclusively engaged in activities related to international trade,
and which is organized and operated principally for purposes of exporting goods or services
produced in the [U.S.A.] or for . . . facilitating the exportation of goods or services produced
in the [U.S.A.] by unaffiliated persons by providing one or more services." 12 U.S.C. §
1843(c)(14)(F)(i)(1982) (emphasis supplied). The point of BESA's explicit provisions for
banks to own or otherwise to invest in a defined trading company is to undo separations between banking and commerce explicit and implicit in the Edge Act of 1919, 12 U.S.C. § 611
et seq. (1982); the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. §§ 347a, 347b, 412 (1982); and the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 26 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982). As this is written, appropriate
congressional committees are considering a bill which, inter alia, would permit federally-in-
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purposes in enacting ETCA4 boil down to an ambition to promote
correction of lamentable American trade imbalances by encouraging
greater and more organized5 exports of goods and services. Reading
between the lines, one can detect the harsh realization epitomized
nicely in a different but certainly related context by Chairman Peter
Rodino of the House Judiciary Committee in stating: "We must confront reality. Most nations with whom we trade either sanction or
support the cartel system."
ETCA addresses two broad spheres: finance and unfair competition. Its Title i17 addresses both liberalized financing of exports8 and
commercial banks' equity participation in specially adapted international trading companies. 9 ETCA Title IV imposes steep subject
matter jurisdiction tests upon those who would challenge conduct
"involving" non-importingforeign commerce under either the Sherman Act 0 or the proscription of "unfair methods of competition" set
forth in Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.1
Unlike Title IV, ETCA Title III did not amend any antitrust or
other law. Title III established administrative machinery 2 through
which persons1 3 engaged in export trade activities14 can achieve prospective and finely focused immunization from traditional forms of
prosecution under various federal and state laws.' 5
The scope of a successful applicant's immunity is set forth in a
Certificate of Review (COR) issued by the United States Departments of Commerce and Justice. The Departments are to administer
the program and issue CORs by reference to standards set forth in
Title III.6 The COR shields the holder against not only classic fedsured thrift institutions to own or otherwise invest in export trading companies as defined in
ETCA Title 11.See S. 2181, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 4401(a) (1982).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 4001(a)(7), (b) (1982).
6. Forbes, Apr. 23, 1984, at 37 (remarking need for relaxed antitrust strictures enjoyed by certain combinations of vessel operators). Representative Rodino might have added
that at least one United Nations Agency, UNCTAD, actively fosters suppliers' cartels.
7. 12 U.S.C. §§ 372, 635a-4, 1843(c)(12), (14) (1982).
8. 12 U.S.C. §§ 372, 635a-4 (1982).
9. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(14) (1982).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3) (1982).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4013, 4014 (1982).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 4021(5) (1982).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 4021(1) (1982). Note that the application for a Certificate of Review
(COR) must specify "conduct limited to export trade" but the eligibility standards guiding
administrative decisions to issue or to deny the application entail attention not only to export
trade but also to "export trade activities, and methods of operation." 15 U.S.C. § 4013 (1982).
The latter two terms are defined at 15 U.S.C. § 4021(3), (4) (1982).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 4016 (1982).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 4013 (1982). The authors take the liberty of encapsulating the process
as it has evolved. The statute can be interpreted to the effect that the Commerce Department
is the program administrator, with the Department of Justice (DOJ) possessed of what
amounts to a veto concerning the breadth of immunizations fashioned by Commerce. There is
respectable authority for the proposition that, despite resistance to being cast as a regulator
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eral antitrust laws but also state antitrust and "unfair competition"
laws 1 7 and "unfair methods of competition" under FTCA. Title III
provides legal as well as equitable remedies for persons injured by
otherwise immunized conduct which proves to be violative of the
statutory standards that guided administrative discretion in issuance
of the relevant COR.1s However, the legal remedy is limited to single damages 9 as contrasted with the trebling feature explicit in section 4 of the Clayton Act.2"
Is it too early to comment on the success or failure of ETCA as
a whole? Inevitably, the answer is "yes." Effectiveness of each of its
main thrusts resists analysis on a real-time basis.
A preliminary official evaluation of ETCA's financial initiatives
became available when the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) honored a
statutory commitment to report to Congress concerning commercial
banks' involvements with trading companies.' In a well-written report, FRB concluded that "it will undoubtedly be a number of years
before an assessment can be attempted on the impact of . . . [the
Act] . . .on U.S. export performance .
*."..22
It is obvious to the
authors, as it was to FRB, that volatile economic and political factors (such as the high relative value currently enjoyed by the United
States dollar) make it all but impossible to remark success or failure
of ETCA Title II provisions in a generic sense.
Ultimate significance of ETCA Titles III and IV will resist
measurement in any scientific sense. While case law will tend to refine (or obscure) the subject matter jurisdiction tests explicit in
ETCA Title IV, there will be no reliable index concerning the number of decisions to forego prosecution which are predicated on
recognitions that the tests cannot be met. Assuming administrators'
during negotiations leading to ETCA, DOJ has assumed a regulatory role. Interview with
Donald Zarin, formerly (prior to January 25, 1984) of the Commerce Department's Office of
General Counsel, reported at 20 U.S. Export Weekly (BNA) 586, 588 (Jan. 31, 1984). Statement of Charles F. Rule, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, before the
House Subcommittee on International Policy and Trade (Aug. 1, 1984) ("Accordingly, the
Department of Justice has worked closely with . . .Commerce to issue regulations and guidelines") (copy on file with the Dickinson Journal of International Law). See also Address by
Irving P. Marguiles, Acting General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, World Trade Institute
Seminar on Advanced InternationalAntitrust, 21 (Dec. 6, 1983) (copy on file with the Dickinson Journal of International Law) (lamenting that "our supplemental information requests
have at times seemed unduly burdensome . . . at times, we seem to be searching for documentary evidence of anticompetitive intent under the antitrust laws .... .
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4016(a), 4021(6) (1982).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b) (1982).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(1) (1982).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
21. ETCA § 205, 12 U.S.C. § 1843 note (1982).
22. Letter from Federal Reserve Board of Governors' Chairman Paul A. Volcker to
Hon. Jake Garn, Chairman, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs (Oct. 9,
1984) (copy on file with the Dickinson Journal of International Law). The Letter reports,
inter alia, formation of 27 trading companies by 29 bank holding companies including one
based in Hong Kong and two controlled by foreign interests.
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sympathy with (and comprehension of) Congress' ambition and the
provisions of ETCA Title III, the long-range efficacy of the COR
mechanism will be as resistant to measurement as the effects of Title
IV. While the gross number of CORs will be obvious and the content
of each will be subject to analysis, their individual and collective economic significance will not be discernible for years.
Issuance of a COR does not mean either that the specified conduct required a shield or that the actual protection provided by a
COR will be put to use immediately. Start-up time is a commercial
fact of life. Just as no two organizations will require the same startup time, no two of them will have identical break-even points or
other constraints on decisions concerning continuation of operations.
Some of the early CORs seem pointless, save for publicity. It is predictable that some COR holders will fail, that others will abandon
objectives implicit in their CORs, and that all surviving holders will
reorient their marketing effort from time to time. Neither occasional
prosecutions for alleged violations of the Title III eligibility standards nor occasional successes in such prosecutions will provide
much evidence as to the efficacy for the United States of the COR
mechanism.
In the long run, only significant reduction of trade imbalances
can determine the success of this legislative design. Success or failure of the design cannot be gauged for many years. Perversely, failure will not demonstrate that the existence of the COR mechanism
has been anticompetitive in any generic sense.
If the legislative design is successful, Congress' invitation of occasional anticompetitive effects will be at least as tolerable a social
cost as the more parochial forty-eight-year-old legislative judgment
embodied in sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the Clayton Act, to tolerate
effectively anticompetitive price discriminations which are cost-justified or made in the name of meeting competition. Bear in mind that,
in the price discrimination equation, either of the statutory affirmative defenses forecloses literally injured plaintiffs, whereas ETCA Title III merely relegates injured parties to single as opposed to treble
damages.
The authors' ruminations concerning ultimate success or failure
of ETCA Title III assumes administrators' informed sympathy with
the Congressional design. Unfortunately, there are mixed signals
concerning both the comprehension and attitude of persons responsible for implementing Title III. These signals provoke wonderment as
to whether Congress' will is to be thwarted by dedicated but poor
DOJ administration to the ultimate effect that the immunization
technique will be tested unfairly, found wanting, and relegated to the
minor role of the Webb-Pomerene Act.
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If the purpose of the ETCA Title III is being thwarted, one
level of irony becomes apparent and another becomes conceivable.
On the more obvious level, it is clear that various responsible people
have been persuaded as to the validity of various ETCA techniques.
Thus, an uncontroversial portion of the proposed Financial Services
Competitive Equity Act would permit federal savings and loan holding companies to become equity investors in export trading companies.2 3 But, more to the point, what of ETCA's "antitrust" provisions? Look to the Administration's 1983 proposal for a National
Productivity & Innovation Act (NPIA).24 It, inter alia, would have
emulated ETCA Title III by providing an administrative mechanism
to equip certain research and development joint ventures with qualified immunity from prosecution under federal and state antitrust
laws. Like ETCA Title III, NPIA would have created a carefully
crafted single-damage remedy for persons injured by the otherwise
immunized joint venture.2 5 Antitrust Division personalities were enthusiastic-at least publicly-about NPIA.2 6 The Bipartisan National Cooperative Research Act of 198427 embodied much of the
1983 proposal.
On a subtler level, there is speculation that Antitrust Division
personalities (some of whom are only inconsistently assigned to
ETCA Title III work) cannot sublimate prosecutorial tendencies in
order to allow even-handed processing of applications for CORs on
the basis Congress intended.2 8 It would be doubly ironic if poor administration, or well-meaning but biased persons in responsible positions, neutralize Title III so that the ultimate effect is congressional
grant of broader immunities to exporters. Carving DOJ out of the
decisional process would be a less socially disturbing consequence.
23. See, e.g., Financial Services Competitive Equity Act, S. 2181, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983).
24. See, e.g., H.R. 4043, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in H.R. Rept. 571, Part 1,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (hereinafter referred to as NPIA).
25. Id. at H.R. 4043, § 3(a) and 10.
26. See, e.g., Statement of William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Oct. 26, 1983); Address by Charles
S. Stark, Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, World Trade Institute Seminar on Advanced InternationalAntitrust, 21-24 (Dec. 5, 1983) (copies on file with the Dickinson Journal of InternationalLaw). Curiously, these statements do not stress ETCA Title II
as a precedent.
27. Bipartisan National Cooperation Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462 (Oct.
11, 1984) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-05).
28. This speculation seems warranted in that personalities formerly or currently with
the Department of Commerce have lamented not only the tendency of unnamed DOJ persons
to play prosecutorial games but the failure of DOJ to organize appropriately to process ETCA
Title II applications. See, e.g., Zarin interview, supra note 16. Each application forwarded by
Commerce is assigned "to a section of the Antitrust Division that has expertise in the products
or services involved in the application." Statement of Charles F. Rule, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, before the House Subcommittee on International Policy and
Trade (Aug. 1, 1984) (copy on file with the Dickinson Journal of InternationalLaw).
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There is political precedent for such a deletion." The present congressional mood to let Americans play a hand in international cartels
was underscored in early 1984 as the antitrust exemptions applicable
to shipping conferences were clarified and liberalized."0
The authors are persuaded that the Antitrust Division of the
Justice Department, for whatever reason, is prejudicing utility of the
Title III mechanism. 3 1 They are also persuaded that there is no malign disposition to resist Congress' will and that the Justice Department, if properly organizedfor the task, is a proper participant in
the COR process. Consequently, the authors offer a recommendation
geared to effecting Congress' will but not requiring further legislation: removal of intradepartmental jurisdiction for Justice Department participation in the Title III administrative process from the
29. For example, the Federal Trade Commission would have been involved in what is
now the ETCA Title III process if an early version of what became Title Ill had been enacted.
See H.R. Rep. No. 637, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982) (reporting favorably on H.R. 1799 entitled "The Export Trading Company Act of 1981") reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code. Cong. & Ad.
News 2431, 2437.
30. The Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801, 812, 813a, 814, 815, 46 (1982), as
amended by the Shipping Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-237, 98 Stat. 67 (1984).
31. Compare, e.g., Address by Marguiles, supra note 16, at 12, (recognition that "the
Administration fought for and won acceptance of a free-standing Title Ill--one which was not
an amendment to Webb-Pomerene and one which did not adopt an eligibility standard by
reference to the antitrust laws-to avoid being bound by the baggage of the construction given
specified antitrust language by cases such as ConcentratedPhosphate" (citing to U.S. v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199 (1968)) with Address by Craig W. Conrath,
Assistant Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, before the Bar Association of
Metropolitan St. Louis, 16 (Oct. 13, 1983) (the "essential reasoning [of Concentrated
Phosphates] is surely applicable . . . if export conduct is directed at transactions the primary
burden of which is borne by the U.S. government, then that conduct cannot be certified" under
ETCA Title 111) (copy on file with the Dickinson Journal of International Law). More recently, Mr. Conrath said that "a Title III certificate ... is granted to a firm for conduct that
would otherwise be legal under the antitrust laws. It is because the conduct would be legal
• . . that a certificate can be issued." Address by Craig W. Conrath, before the Antitrust
Section of the Minnesota Bar Association, 6 (Mar. 28, 1984) (copy on file with the Dickinson
Journal of InternationalLaw). Another DOJ personality has said that "A certificate is issued
only where the conduct would otherwise be lawful under the antitrust laws and meets the
requirements of . . . [ETCA]. . . . Because [the four standards set forth in ETCA Title 1II]
are essentially the competition standards of the antitrust laws, our analysis is essentially the
same one we apply to other proposed export conduct under the . . . Business Review Procedure or in other typical antitrust analysis." Statement of Charles F. Rule, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division, before the House subcommittee on International Policy
and Trade (Aug. 1, 1984) (copy on file with the Dickinson Journal of International Law).
Such attitudes can proceed only from a conviction that the four eligibility standards ordained
by Congress embrace all substantive rules of decision explicit and implicit in at least traditional federal antitrust laws. That the standards do not summarize all substantive rules of
federal antitrust, just as they do not summarize all relevant FTC and state rules of substantive
decision, should be self-evident. Rather than orienting administrators to pre-existing antitrust
rules, Congress provided eligibility standards focused on domestic effects of proposed conduct.
Parenthetically, DOJ and Commerce have joined in a minimization of FTC precedent concerning the content of the term "unfair methods of competition" as used in one of the four standards. Guidelines for Issuance of Export Trade Certificates of Review, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,937,
15,939 (1983). Mr. Marguiles, who cannot be described as being in diametric opposition to
Mr. Conrath's expression, nonetheless evinces a more open attitude that "neither Commerce
nor the Justice Department can decline to certify gray-area conduct without fully justifying
that decision." Address by Marguiles, supra note 16, at 9.
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Foreign Commerce Section of the Antitrust Division to a newly organized and specialized unit reporting directly to the head of the
Civil Division. The new office can and should be charged, by order of
the Attorney General, with reviewing applications for CORs in very
much the same way that SEC and various state securities commissions review disclosure documentation pertinent to registering corporate equity issues. Thus, initially, responsible DOJ personalities
would be challenged to test adequacy of disclosures within the applications and prima facie conformance with Title III standards rather
than to speculate about applicants' unstated motivations, their devotion to hard but fair domestic competition, or spectral potencies for
adverse effects. Once a COR is issued, the same office would have
the burden of reviewing COR holders' annual and special reports3 2
as well as recommending revocation proceedings in appropriate
33

cases.

II.

ETCA Title III

A.

Function and Objectives of the COR Mechanism

Alone among the four major divisions of ETCA, Title III lacks
its own statutory short title. Its caption within ETCA is simple and
to the point: "Export Trade Certificates of Review." The title deals
with availability and maintenance4 of significant shields against penal and civil consequences for export-related conduct 5 that otherwise would expose COR holders to liabilities under "antitrust laws"
as defined for purposes of Title III. This specialized term of art includes not only state and classic federal antitrust laws but also "unfair methods of competition" under FTCA section 5(a) and state
"unfair competition" laws. 6
To achieve a Title III shield, a "person ''a must apply to the
Commerce Department for a COR and thereafter cooperate with
those responsible for processing the application and evaluating its
conformance to statutory eligibility standards.3 8 Commerce has primary responsibility for receipt and processing of applications but
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4014(a), 4018 (1982). While these reports are to be made to Commerce, DOJ will presumably have access.
33. Note that DOJ is not a party necessary to the determination that a COR is to be
revoked. 15 U.S.C. § 4014(b)(2) (1982). DOJ seems a necessary participant in the decisional
process if proceedings are aimed at or are likely to culminate in modification of a COR. Id.
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4012, 4013, 4014, 4016(b)(5), and 4018 (1982).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 4016 (1982).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 4021(6) (1982).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 4021(5) (1982). See also definition of "member" at 48 Fed. Reg.
10,596, 10,600.
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4012, 4013 (1982). As stated at supra note 2, this Article does not
elaborate on the procedures appropriate to procuring and maintaining a COR. For greater
detail concerning such procedures, see 37 C.P.S. (BNA) International Opportunities & The
Export Trading Company Act of 1982 (1984).
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DOJ has what amounts to a pocket veto concerning ultimate allowance of a COR.3 9 Upon issuance of a COR, a holder is well advised
to police its activities, not only to guard against straying beyond the
terms of the COR and the underlying eligibility standards but to
adapt to a reporting regime contemplated by Title l1.4"
For purposes of Title III, "antitrust laws" include the Sherman
Act; import-focused provisions of the Wilson Tariff Act; the Clayton
Act; FTCA "to the extent [it] prohibits unfair methods of competition;" and, "any State antitrust or unfair competition law."' 1 Title
III's address to the Sherman Act and FTCA must be understood in
context of their amendments by ETCA Title IV."2 From the perspective of a potential holder, the virtue implicit in a COR is possession
of a shield against the ordinary penal and civil consequences otherwise applicable to export conduct detailed in the COR which violates one or more of the "antitrust laws." Despite well-meant expressions to the contrary, a COR neither precludes nor can preclude
commencement of a suit.' 3 Its value is to substantiate a motion to
dismiss or plea in avoidance.
Congress provided eligibility standards to be used by Com39. 15 U.S.C. § 4013(b) (1982). Note that a COR may be subjected to "any terms and
conditions" either Commerce or DOJ "deems necessary to assure compliance" with the competition standards which are to guide administrative discretion. 15 U.S.C. § 4013(b)(3) (1982)
(emphasis supplied). Early CORs included such language geared to averting recurrence of the
Webb-Pomerene scenario addressed in Concentrated Phosphates. See supra note 31. See also
Interview with Donald Zarin (Jan. 25, 1984), reprinted in 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 204, 205 (Feb. 2, 1984) in which a former member of the Commerce Department's
Office of General Counsel indicates that ETCA Title Ill was adopted as a "free-standing
statute" in order to avoid Webb-Pomerene precedent such as Concentrated Phosphates,supra
note 31.
40. The statute requires that:
(a)(1) Any applicant who receives a certificate of review (A) shall promptly report to the Secretary any change relevant to
the matters specified in the certificate, and
(B) may submit to the Secretary an application to amend the certificate to reflect the effect of the change on the conduct specified in the
certificate.
15 U.S.C. § 4014(a)(I)(A),(B)(1982). In addition, the statute states that:
Every person to whom a certificate of review is issued shall submit to the Secretary an annual report, in such form and at such time as the Secretary may
require, that updates where necessary the information required by section
4012(a) of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 4018 (1982).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 4021(6) (1982) (emphasis supplied).
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, and 45(a)(1), (3) (1982).
43. See, e.g., Sylvester, Is There a New Tool for Antitrust?, 6 NAT'L L.J. 1 (Dec. 19,
1983), in which a COR was styled as "a guarantee that neither the Justice Department nor
any state attorney general will sue." Id. at 7. See also Ryan, The Export Trading Company
Act of 1982: Antitrust Panacea,Placebo, or Pitfall?, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 501, 515 (1983), in
which FTC is added to entities which "cannot bring suit based on the certified conduct." Such
expressions ignore not only the essentially procedural significance of a COR but also ETCA §
306(b)(5) by which the Attorney General retains a limited right to sue for an injunction
against conduct otherwise shielded by a COR and FTC's continuing jurisdiction to address
"unfair acts or practices in or affecting commerce."
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merce and DOJ when appraising individual applications for CORs.
These standards use various concepts implicit and explicit in FTCA
and various classic federal antitrust laws. However, these standards
do not replicate many, if any, substantive rules of decision embodied
in classic antitrust. 4 The standards' collective theme is avoidance of
particularized domestic effects. To the degree such effects are absent, a certificate "shall" issue even though the conduct in question
is ordinarily offensive to substantive rules of decision explicit or implicit in the "antitrust laws" as expansively defined in Title III. Sensitive to a possibility that conduct specified within a given COR may
prove to be violative of one or more of the eligibility standards despite the pre-issuance Commerce-DOJ review, Congress explicitly
provided civil causes of action for certain somewhat Americanized
persons injured by such a violation.4 5 Thus, on the face of the matter, there is a correspondence with the registration regime of the Securities Act of 1933 4 and the specialized remedy provided by its
section 11.47
There are other similarities between Title III and the '33 Act.
The COR application process includes an acceleration feature4 8 as
does the '33 Act.4 9 Plaintiffs success in achieving a remedy under
section 11 of the '33 Act, after SEC allowed the predicate registration to become effective, neither impeaches nor undoes the registration. Similarly, ETCA does not contemplate that successful pleading
of a. private Title III cause of action will undo the predicate COR. A
44. A certificate of review shall be issued to any applicant that establishes that
its specified export trade, export trade activities, and methods of operation will (1) result in neither a substantial lessening of competition or restraint on trade within the United States nor a substantial restraint of the export trade of any competitor of the applicant,
(2) not unreasonably enhance, stabilize, or depress prices within the
United States of the goods, wares, merchandise, or services of the
class exported by the applicant,
(3) not constitute unfair methods of competition against competitors
engaged in export of goods, wares, merchandise, or services of the
class exported by the applicant, and
(4) not include any act that may reasonably be expected to result in
the sale for consumption or resale within the United States of the
goods, wares, merchandise, or services exported by the applicant.
15 U.S.C. § 4013(a) (1982) (emphasis supplied).
45. The term "person" means an individual who is a resident of the United States; a
partnership that is created under and exists pursuant to the laws of any state or of the United
States; a state or local government entity; a corporation, whether organized as a profit or
nonprofit corporation, that is created under and exists pursuant to the laws of any state or of
the United States; or any association or combination, by contract or other arrangement, between or among such persons. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4016(b)(1)-(4). See also 15 U.S.C. § 4021(5)
(1982).
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77f (1982).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 4013(c) (1982). The ETCA Title III acceleration feature is susceptible
to partial or otherwise qualified use. 49 Fed. Reg. 9762-63 (1983).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1982).
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section 11 remedy subsumes effectiveness of a registration. Likewise,
a private ETCA Title III remedy subsumes issuance of a COR.
Under Title III and assuming effectiveness of a COR, suitably
Americanized plaintiffs can obtain either single damages or equitable relief upon satisfying heavy proof burdens, or both.50 Since successful prosecution of a private cause of action does not invalidate a
COR, such a success will establish only that a particularmanifestation of an otherwise immunized species of commercial conduct is injurious to a given qualified plaintiff. As in the case of judgment for
plaintiff under section 11 of the '33 Act (and quite ignoring the jingoism implicit in the Title III cause of action), the prior administrative judgment to issue a COR is not necessarily impeached by successful prosecution of a civil suit. The COR, like the effective '33
Act registration statement, 1 survives unless responsible bureaucrats
successfully seek revocation. While ETCA Title III provides grounds
52
upon (and the mechanism through) which a COR may be revoked,
there is no necessary relationship between revocation proceedings
and successful suits by private parties under ETCA Title III. Revocation of a COR is prospective and does not impeach the period in
which the COR was in effect. 3
It is entirely predictable that aggrieved private plaintiffs will sue
under traditional antitrust theories and that complaints will be
amended to include Title III theories when defendants interpose
CORs. Since treble damages will be available only for injuries inflicted by conduct beyond the scope of an effective COR, it is equally
predictable that private plaintiffs will strive for narrow interpretation
of CORs. Further, plaintiff's discovery will be oriented to developing
that the CORs were procured by fraud.
Congress anticipated allegations of fraud in procurement of
CORs.54 If plaintiff succeeds on a "fraud on the office" theory, 55
ETCA Title III provides that an implicated COR is void ab initio
"with respect to any export trade, export trade activities, or methods
of operation for which a certificate was procured by fraud." 58 Lest
one doubt that Congress meant such a particularized reaction to
fraud, recourse to the ultimate Conference Report is instructive:
50. 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(I), (3) (1982).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 77(h)(d) (1982).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 4014(b) (1982).
53. Id.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 4013(f) (1982).
55. Apologies to the Patent Bar for adoption of part of its colloquial.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 4013(f) (1982) (emphasis supplied). The authors caution against any
presumption that fraud in procuring a COR will expose the perpetrator to a monopolization
count. See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965). The nature of the patent monopoly differs dramatically from a COR's grant of qualified immunity.
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"any aspect of a certificate procured by fraud is void ab initio. ' ' 57
Thus, if a COR covers activities other than those tainted by proven
"fraud on the office," it is quite arguable that untainted parts of the
COR will survive successful attack on the tainted portion. Curiously,
"fraud on the office" is not among the explicit grounds for administrative revocation in toto.5 8 This, of course, is not to say that competent government counsel will be unable to prosecute a revocation
case using evidence of "fraud on the office."
In any event, Congress produced an interestingly crafted mechanism. The parallel to the '33 Act is not noted in ETCA's legislative
history. Congress obviously was aware of a potency that CORshielded conduct could injure third parties. Indeed, it seems that
Congress was calculatedly callous. The availability of both CORs
and private remedies under Title III was restricted to somewhat
Americanized "persons." 5 9 This was consistent with a comparably
callous attitude evinced in Title IV.6 0 In any event, no conscientious
civil servant need lament that successful prosecution of a private
cause of action under ETCA Title III evidences failure of those
charged with reviewing applications for CORs.' If it were other57. H.R. Rep. No. 924, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 2501, 2511. Note that administrators may take a more draconian position. See, e.g.,
Address by Marguiles, supra note 16, at 7. Congress failed to indicate the burden of proof to
be carried by one who would seek to prove that a COR was procured through fraud. Obviously, defendants will urge that plaintiffs must prove scienter and that merely negligent misrepresentations do not constitute fraud.
58. The explicit grounds for revocation are that (a) a COR holder has failed to comply
with requests by Commerce for data pertinent to determining whether actual conduct continues to comply with the competition standards guiding issuance of CORs or (b) a determination
by Commerce that a COR holder's actual conduct "no longer" complies with the standards. 15
U.S.C. § 4014(b)(2) (1982). If the remedy is modification, DOJ has a role in the refinement.
Id.
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4016(b), 4021(5) (1982).
60. The Foreign Trade Improvements Act of 1982 burdens prosecution for conduct
involving non-importing foreign commerce, under either the Sherman Act or the "unfair methods of competition" language of FTCA § 5(a) by requiring satisfaction of a jurisdictional
standard to the effect that the conduct in question has a "direct, substantial and reasonably
foreseeable effect" on either (a) domestic or import commerce or (b) "export commerce...
of a person engaged in such . . . commerce in the" U.S.A. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45(a)(1),(3)
(1982). The latter is a most significant political statement since it confounds conventional wisdom to the effect that the substantive norms of the antitrust laws exist to protect competition
as opposed to competitors. However, Congress did not go overboard. If the jurisdictional nexus
is satisfied by a focus on a person engaged in exporting from the U.S.A., the implicated rules
of decision apply "only for injury to export business in the" U.S.A. Id. It must be noted that
the holdings of U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America (ALCOA), 148 F.2d 416, 440-45 (2d Cir.
1945) and Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1976) survive
unscathed. ALCOA and Timberlane relate to imports.
61. See, e.g., Address by Marguiles, supra, note 16, at 6 ("A successful private cause
of action against certified conduct can be successfully prosecuted only if the certificate was
incorrectly issued . . . because . . . [Commerce and DOJ] . . . improperly applied the four
. . . [competition standards] . . . or if the certified conduct no longer meets those . . . standards .... ") (emphasis supplied). This ignores the history of the '33 Act. More importantly,
however, it ignores that CORs address a process in an ever-changing trade world rather than
in a controlled experiment or model. Nevertheless, a refrain not unlike that of Mr. Marguiles
appears in the Guidelines for the Issuance of Export Trade Certificates of Review, 48 Fed.
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wise, Congress could have provided and can provide. Surely, personnel of the SEC's Corporate Finance Division are unlikely to lament
that occasional recoveries under the '33 Act's section 11 impeach the
registration process.
B.

Contrast with ETCA Title IV

Titles III and IV of ETCA have largely separate legislative histories. They were married late in the legislative process. The marriage is far more comfortable than, e.g., that between the first and
third sections of the Robinson-Patman Act. 62 Titles III and IV are
not to be understood as alternatives.6 3 Title III applies to the Sherman Act and FTCA as amended by Title IV.
What became ETCA Title IV was structured to counter American industries' perceptions of unpredictability and consequent inequity in enforcement of the Sherman Act and FTCA.64 This was accomplished by significantly steepening subject matter jurisdictional
thresholds to be overcome by private and public prosecutors addressing non-importingforeign commerce otherwise subject to the Sherman Act or FTCA's condemnation of "unfair methods of competition."'65 Since various writers seem to miss the point, 6 it should be
stressed that the benefit of Title IV amendments is not limited to
exporting activities. Title III is much more finely focused. Title IV
directly impedes recourse to substantive rules of decision otherwise
applicable to conduct "involving" non-importingforeign commerce
that plaintiff could invoke. Title III is not designed to shield any
Reg. 15,937 (1983). "Such a cause of action could arise if the certificate had been incorrectly
issued through misapplication of the four eligibility standards or if certified conduct no longer
meets the standards because of changed circumstances." Id. Can there not be changed circumstances which impeach a COR only in such peculiar applications as to warrant administrative
contentment with having served overall legislative objectives?
62. 15 U.S.C. § 13-13a (1982). The principal thrust of § 2(a) of the Clayton Act is
against price discriminations among purchasers of goods for use, consumption or resale within
the U.S.A. The goods in question must be of like grade and quality. Plaintiff need not prove
defendant's intent to discriminate or anticompetitive purpose. Indeed, defendant's knowledge
of the discrimination is not necessarily an issue. Competitive injury is assessed by reference to
competition with the seller ("primary level") or the favored customer ("secondary level") or
the customers of either such class ("tertiary level"). Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act is
not concerned with price discrimination alone. It defines three offenses. The first is a price
discrimination theory but requires that the prosecutor prove knowing discrimination among
customers for goods of like grade, quality, and quantity. The second also is a price discrimination theory but looks to proof of regional differentials for predatory purposes. The third looks
to predatory sales at unreasonably low prices rather than to discrimination. Only the second is
limited to sales and intended effect within the U.S.A.
63. But see, e.g., Golden & Kolb, The Export Trading Company Act of 1982: An
American Response to Foreign Competition, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 743 (1983).
64. H.R. Rep. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982) reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2487.
65. See supra note 59.
66. See, e.g., Ryan, The Export Trading Act of 1982: Antitrust Panacea, Placebo, or
Pitfall?, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 501, 505 (1983); K.P. Pinegar, The Export Trading Company
Act of 1982: An Overview, II INT'L Bus. LAW. 13, 16 (1983).
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commerce except that oriented to exporting.
ETCA Title III did not amend any other statute. Title III permits administrative action to immunize prospective specified conduct
from the usual consequences of prosecutions under not only the
Sherman Act and FTCA's proscription of "unfair methods of competition," each as amended by ETCA Title IV,67 but also under the
Clayton Act, antitrust provisions of the Wilson Tariff Act, 68 and
state antitrust and unfair competition laws. 9 Title III is not selfexecuting whereas Title IV is. Title III is both broader and narrower
than Title IV. Title III is narrower than Title IV in that it does not
explicitly contemplate benefiting those engaged in non-importing foreign commerce other than export-related activities described in a
public record. Title III is broader than Title IV in that Title IV
neither contemplates preemption of state law nor modifies applicability of substantive rules set forth in the Clayton and Wilson Tariff
Acts. The Titles are alike in that both affect jurisdiction but, if jurisdiction exists, neither modifies pre-existing substantive rules of
decision.
Title IV presents some intricate construction problems. Thus,
what did Congress imply in using the word "involving ' 7 as opposed
to a more restrictive word? There is no doubt that Congress understands the use of the phrase "in commerce" when it intends to be
restrictive.7 1 From this, it seems fair to infer that Title IV could
have been but was not written to impose the steeper jurisdictional
thresholds on conduct in rather than conduct involving non-importing trade or commerce.72 It is not the purpose of this article to predict what courts will do when defendants allege that plaintiff has
failed to assert a federal question because defendants' essentially importing or domestic conduct nevertheless involves non-importing foreign operations or exporting. There seems to be an open invitation
for courts to develop another "rule of reason" although, to be sure,
at a very different level than that generated for seventy-odd years.
The authors do not anticipate liberality equivalent to the Supreme
Court's incredibly open approach to what is comprehended by "in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities" in SEC Rule lOb67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45(a)(3) (1982).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 4021(6) (1982) incorporates, inter alia, "antitrust laws" as defined in
section one of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1982). Thus, anomalously, provisions of the
Wilson Tariff Act are affected.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 4021(6) (1982).
70. See supra note 65.
71. Contra, e.g., FTCA § 5(a) before and after the Magnuson-Moss Warranty - Federal Trade Commissions Improvements Act of 1975. The original focus was on "unfair methods of competition in commerce." 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914). The current language looks to
"unfair methods of competition ... or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3) (1982).
72. See supra note 63.
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573

In order to plead antitrust or other theories before a federal
court, plaintiffs have the affirmative duty to establish the court's jurisdiction.7 4 Conversely, defendants in state courts of general jurisdiction usually have the burden of demonstrating lack of jurisdiction.
Availability of treble damages in the federal forum tends to orient
plaintiffs to federal rather than state courts for vindication of Sherman Act theories. ETCA section 402 effectively burdens plaintiffs in
either type of forum to establish jurisdiction over persons by showing
conduct involving non-importing foreign commerce having a "direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on domestic commerce, import commerce, or the export trade of a person engaged in
export commerce in the United States. Title IV is a political statement that provides a strategic defense for all non-importing foreign
operations whether or not they entail exporting. Title III, although it
too presents nice questions regarding the nature and quality of ex' springs from strategic considerations
port "methods of operation," 75
concerning encouragement of exports but provides a tactical weapon.
Although some (incredibly) say a COR prevents prosecutionse7 it
provides only a basis for a motion to dismiss in actions alleging violation of "antitrust laws" as defined in ETCA Title III. However, the
COR provides no jurisdictional basis for dismissal of private actions
brought under ETCA Title III. Note, incidentally, that the Title III
cause of action does not obligate plaintiff to demonstrate "direct,
substantial and reasonably foreseeable" effects of the conduct as the
price of establishing jurisdiction.
It is inescapable that ETCA Titles III and IV are designed to
encourage exports. It is equally inescapable that Title IV may encourage some very interesting foreign initiatives other than importing or exporting. One can conceive of a plaintiff who, having reason
to complain of conduct involving foreign commerce otherwise susceptible to characterization as a per se offense, is unable by reason of
ETCA Title IV to cause an American court to reach the pertinent
substantive rules of decision. This need not surprise. It is of the essence of Title IV.
C. Optimum Effect of ETCA Title III
ETCA section 306(a) is deceptively simple. Excepting two classes of private prosecutions and one of public prosecution, it provides
that "no criminal or civil action may be .brought under the antitrust
73.
74.
75.
76.

Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 7 (3d ed. 1976).
15 U.S.C. § 4021(4) (1982).
See supra note 43.
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laws against a person to whom a . . .[COR] . . .is issued which is
based on conduct . . .specified in, and [complying] with the terms
of a [COR] which . . .was in effect when the conduct occurred.""
As noted earlier,7 8 "antitrust laws" is a term of art embracing state
and federal laws well beyond those usually captioned "antitrust.17 9
"Person" is also a term of art which looks, in the original analysis, to "individuals" resident in the United States as well as to partnerships or corporations organized under the laws of the United
States or any of its states. In addition, the term "person" embraces
"any association . . .by contract or other arrangement, between or
among" the classes of persons originally comprehended.8 0 Definition
of "person" identifies those entitled not only to apply for and receive
a CORI' but also private parties entitled to bring a cause of action
under Title

111.82

One of the requirements of being a person for pur-

poses of ETCA Title III is some colorable claim to being an American entity.83
Persons covered by a COR untainted by fraud achieve a qualified shield only against charges under the broadly-defined "antitrust
laws" which are "based on conduct

. . .

specified in" and complying

with the COR. The shield is designed to avoid exposures under the
Sherman Act, the (import-oriented) antitrust provisions of the Wilson Tariff Act, the Clayton Act, and FTCA section 5 "to the extent
[it] prohibits unfair methods of competition," as well as "any State
antitrust or unfair competition law."8 "
77. 15 U.S.C. § 4016(a) (1982). The exceptions are remarked, infra, notes 91-109 and
accompanying text. They do not permit criminal prosecution for conduct comprehended by a
valid COR.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 4021(6) (1982) provides as follows:
[T]he term antitrust laws means the antitrust laws, as such term is defined in
the first section of the Clayton Act (citation omitted) and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (citation omitted) (to the extent that section 5 (citation omitted) prohibits unfair methods of competition), and any State antitrust
or unfair competition law ....
80. 15 U.S.C. § 4021(5) (1982).
81. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4012, 4013(a) (1982). Practitioners are urged to be very cautious
concerning characterizing those for whom a COR is insulating. Carefully compare regulatory
provisions at 48 Fed. Reg. 10,596, 10,600, 10,602 (1983) with the statute when making judgments as to who can interpose a COR in actual litigation. Note, in this connection, the administrators have condoned an open-ended membership. 49 Fed. Reg. 20,890 (1984) (Summary of
Certificate).
82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 306(b)(1), 4021(5) (1982).
83. ETCA Title Ill defines a person to include an individual who is a resident of the
U.S.A.; a partnership [or corporation] "that is created under and exists pursuant to the laws of
any State or of the United States; . . .or any association or combination, by contract or other
arrangement, between or among such persons." 15 U.S.C. § 4021(5) (1982). ETCA Title IV
has a similar (and obviously intended) bias in that, addressing anticompetitive effects on persons, it looks only to those engaged in export commerce in the U.S.A. and, even more narrowly, only to injury sustained by "export business in the" U.S.A. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45(a)(3)
(1982).
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4016(a), 4021(6) (1982).
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There is no qualitative or other distinction between conduct ordinarily offensive per se to the Sherman Act and that potentially
stigmatized through application of the "rule of reason." There is no
excision of section 7 of the Clayton Act from the protection of a
COR shield. There are, however, oversights. Thus, there is no insulation against the all but forgotten penal section 3 of the RobinsonPatman Act which has two rules potentially applicable to exporters. 8 5 Similarly, a COR does not insulate against either the FTCA
address to "unfair . . .acts or practices" or the sometimes effectively punitive investigatory powers of FTC.86
On an ideal rather than a pragmatic level, the principal benefits
COR
are to shield against punitive damage, penal and equitable
of a
remedies otherwise available in instances of violations of the Sherman Act and state antitrust laws; treble damage and equitable remedies arising from sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 7 and 8 of the Clayton
Act; 87 and, FTC's power to enjoin "unfair methods of competition." 88 On a more pragmatic level, the real value of a COR relates
to classic Sherman Act concepts; their analogues in state antitrust
schemes; the potential nuisance of sections 7 and 8 of the Clayton
Act to exporting joint ventures; and, during the current administration, the power of FTC. The last is qualified by reason of a recognition that a different administration could reinstitute an ideologic
85. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1982) provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to be a party to, or assist in, any transaction of sale, or contract to
sell, which discriminates to his knowledge against competitors of the purchaser,
in that, any discount, rebate, allowance, or advertising service charge available
at the time of such transaction to said competitors in respect of a sale of goods
of like grade, quality, and quantity; . . .or, to sell, or contract to sell, goods at
unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating
a competitor. Any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall,
upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1982).
87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(c), 13(d), 13(e), 18, 19 (1982). Section 2(a) and 3 of the Clayton
Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 13a, 14 (1982)] are omitted for the simple reason that they focus on transfers of goods for "use, consumption or resale within the" U.S.A. Thus, they do not read on
price discriminations between or among customers for exported commodities, tying via an exported product, exclusive dealing arrangements for exported goods, or exaction of requirements
- F. Supp.
contracts from foreign customers. See Raul Int'l Corp. v. Sealed Power Corp.,
__
(D.N.J. 1984), 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 725-26 (Apr. 12, 1984).
88. It must be stressed the ETCA did not limit FTC power to prosecute concerning
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982).
Those who wonder if that is meaningful would do well to consider the neo-antitrust holdings in
FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966) (Brown Shoe 11) and FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972) (S&H). To those who minimize the meaningfulness of such
holdings by reference to the paucity of subsequent decisions squarely relying on Brown Shoe H
and/or S&H [see, e.g., Stack, 'Much Ado About Nothing'.- A Pragmatic View of Section 5,50
ANTITRUST L.J. 811 (1982)], the authors urge attention to the sheer volume of consent decrees
and the inability of anyone to guesstimate the decisional process of consenting respondents and
as well as the unreported volume of administrative agreements terminating "informal"
investigations.
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FTC leadership 89 which, if trade balances were no longer a sore subject, might be tempted to pursue even COR-possessed entities for
otherwise shielded conduct which is alleged to involve unfair acts or
practices affecting commerce. 90
Existence of a COR shield contemplates that persons "to
whom" it is issued 9 will be significantly insulated against private
and public prosecutions under the "antitrust laws" liberally defined
in Title 111.92 Congress did not foreclose all prosecutions for conduct
comprehended by a COR. As noted earlier, 93 there are "exceptions."
No exception however permits penal consequences.
Despite existence of a COR shielding the conduct in question,
DOJ can sue "to enjoin conduct threatening clear and irreparable
harm to the national interest." 94 Just what constitutes the "national
interest" is not defined. If this "exception" focused on violations of
section 2 of the Sherman Act or pertinent provisions of the Wilson
Tariff Act, it might begin to make sense. However, the operative
language commits DOJ to "file suit pursuant to Section 15 of the
Clayton Act ' 95 which contemplates only violations of the Clayton
Act itselP 6 rather than the "antitrust laws" defined elsewhere in the
97
1914 Act.
The principal thrust of substantive rules of decision set forth in
the Clayton Act is aimed at particularized species of conduct
deemed to present a potential for full-blown anticompetitive conduct.
Sections 2(a) and 3 of the Clayton Act are oriented to transactions
in goods "for use, consumption or resale within" the United States.
Thus, these sections are of no consequence in terms of benefit from a
COR.98 It is hard to conceive of sections 2(d) and (e) 99 affecting
anything remotely classifiable as the "national interest." Is the point
to encourage DOJ to Monday-morning quarterbacking concerning
CORs which effectively sanction kickbacks prohibited by section
2(c),' 00 joint ventures falling within section 7,101 or interlocks banned
89. See, e.g., Remarks of the FTC Chairman Michael Pertshuck at the 1977 New
England Antitrust Conference, reprintedin 840 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) F-I, F-4
(Nov. 24, 1977).
90. See Brown Shoe II and S&H, supra note 88.
91. 15 U.S.C. §4016(a) (1982). See, warning at supra note 81.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 4021(6) (1982).
93. See supra text accompanying note 77.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 306(b)(6) (1982).
95. Id.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1982).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1982). DOJ authority to obtain equitable relief against violations
of the Sherman Act appears at § 4 of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
98. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a), 14 (1982).
99. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(d), 13(e) (1982).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1982).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1982).
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by section 8?102 This seems unlikely. The legislative history is not
revealing.
While it is predictable that applicants will seek CORs precluding application of sections 7 and 8 to jointly-owned export trading
companies formed by persons who are otherwise domestic competitors, it is difficult to conceive of an applicant publicly avowing an
intent to kickback. It is equally difficult to conceive that a CORshielded joint export venture could eventually threaten the "national
interest" unless it ran afoul of rules dealing with contraband. But,
other than when a president engages in pure "jaw-boning," such
rules usually have their own enforcement mechanisms and violations
do not necessarily implicate the Clayton Act. It seems most likely
that the limiting of DOJ to section 15 of the Clayton Act is representative of nothing other than legislative oversight.
In any event, ETCA section 306(b)(5) burdens DOJ beyond the
explicit terms of section 15 of the Clayton Act (and, should there be
a suitable oversight amendment, section 4 of the Sherman Act).
Typically, public prosecutors seeking to restrain conduct allegedly
violative of substantive norms of the Clayton Act need to show only
the probability of injury to some aspect of the competitive process.
ETCA adds an explicit demand for proof that the undefined "na10 3
tional interest" is threatened with "clear and irreparable harm."'
While "national interest" presumably has a meaning relevant in an
Act otherwise promoting exports, the meaning is not easy to deduce
or even to induce. Can it be that the point was to assist in coercing
persons to abandon otherwise shielded conduct to aid long- or shortterm Executive agreements which lack the force of domestic law but
nonetheless are deemed to be supportive of a given foreign policy
goal? Such a Machiavellian purpose is unlikely. The authors have no
easy answer' 04 and suspect that DOJ is in the same boat.
Other "exceptions" from the shielding effect of a COR are more
fairly described as facets of the newly-created right of action. Suitably Americanized private parties "injured as a result of conduct engaged in under a" COR can sue for "injunctive relief, actual damages, the interest on actual damages, and the cost of suit (including
a reasonable attorney's fee) for the failure to comply with the standards" pursuant to which the COR issued. 10 5 Injured plaintiffs are
directed to "proceed as if" the action is one "commenced under sec102. 15 U.S.C. § 20 (1982).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 306(b)(6) (1982).
104. See, e.g., D. Unkovic, J. Maher & N. LaMont, InternationalOpportunities,supra
note 2, in the context of Maher, SupranationalRegimes for Multinationals:The New Order
with a New Face? 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 289 (1979), reprinted in 2 CORP. COUNSEL'S ANNUAL
1277 (E. Burchall & J. Spires ed. 1980).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b) (1982) (emphasis supplied).
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tion 4 or section 16 of the Clayton Act." Although the applicable
rules of procedure are within the Clayton Act, the only pertinent
rules of decision and remedies are those provided by ETCA Title
111.106 Thus, one is left to infer that the exceptional Title III damage
actions must be brought in United States District Courts" 7 and that
standing tests' 0 8 otherwise applicable to private suitors seeking relief
under the traditional "antitrust laws" ' 9 are equally pertinent to Title III plaintiffs at law and in equity to the degree they are more
rigorous than ETCA section 306(b) itself. Note particularly that
standing to seek injunctive relief under ETCA section 306(b) is
keyed to actual injury.
What can plaintiffs hope to gain? Unlike the provisions of treble
damages by section 4 of the Clayton Act, 11 0 ETCA section
306(b)(1) affords only actual damages."' This disincentive is
sharply accentuated by plaintiff's burden to overcome an explicit
presumption "that conduct which is specified in and complies with
a" COR comports with the eligibility standards" 2 and by plaintiff's
exposure, if unsuccessful, to liability for defendant's costs including
3
attorney's fees.1
Central to plaintiffis case are the Title -III eligibility standards." 4 While all four can be styled as "competitive injury" standards, they need not be so styled. For example, the fourth standard
would preclude the COR holder from protection in cases where
reimportation of goods or services exported by the holder would occur. In any event, the plaintiff must address itself to violation of one
or more of these standards. Thus, even if defendant demonstrably
breached a condition imposed on a COR by the issuing authority,"'
plaintiff's cause of action is not thereby established (although its
106. Id.
107. 15 U.S.C. §16 (1982). Note that, while § 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 16
(1982)) commits treble damage plaintiffs to federal courts, § 16 of the Act contemplates that
"any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties" can honor private parties'
petitions for injunctive relief against antitrust violations. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982).
108. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Calif. v. Calif. State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983); Blue Shield, Inc. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982); and
Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) in connection with treble damage actions, and
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 491 (1977) in connection with
equity.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1982).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1982).
II1.
15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(1) (1982). There is some small solace for the successful Title
Ill damage plaintiff in the expectancy of interest on actual damages. In this regard, ETCA
stands in opposition to the Clayton Act approach of leaving interest to the discretion of the
court. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1982). Both provisions contemplate award of costs including attorneys'
fees. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(3) (1982).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(4) (1982).
114. See supra note 44.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 4013(b)(3) (1982).
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prosecution may be aided). Plaintiff must prove defendant's "failure
to comply with the" eligibility standards. While a literalist might
conclude that defendant is liable only if it breached all of the standards, it seems instead that failure to honor one will suffice.
ETCA sections 303(a)(1), (2) and (4) will prove daunting to
plaintiffs." 6 Plaintiff's case must be proven by establishing substantiality of adverse competitive effects on domestic competition or on
exporters competing with defendant; unreasonable effects on domestic pricing of relevant goods or services; or reasonably foreseeable
reimports of defendant's exports. These proof burdens are in excess
of the per se rules which, inter alia, they supplant.
ETCA section 303(a)(3), however, may prove to be a sleeping
giant. It contemplates "unfair methods of competition against competitors engaged in the export of goods . . . or services of the class
exported by" the COR holder." 7 While a plaintiff attempting to establish a violation of ETCA Section 303(a)(3) must prove actual injury and causation, he can rely on a considerable body of FTCA
precedent characterizing species of conduct. FTCA precedent establishes that an "unfair method of competition" can be recognized
without necessary reference either to the state of mind of the actor
or to effects coextensive with those associated with antitrust violations. " 8 Such precedent minimizes concern with scienter, foreseeability, and substantiality of untoward effects. While DOJ and Commerce have discounted the worth of FTCA precedent, 1 9 it is
inescapable that Congress repeatedly used the phrase "unfair methods of competition" in designing reliefs from FTCA explicit in
ETCA Titles III and IV. Since courts (and not administrators) will
apply the substantive rules of decision pertinent to private causes of
action under Title III, administrators who ignore FTCA precedent
when issuing CORs may aid potential plaintiffs!
116. 15 U.S.C. § 4013(a)(1), (2), (4) (1982).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 4013(a)(3) (1982).
118. In a classic case lost by FTC, the Supreme Court taught that methods can be
stigmatized as unfair if they are "such as injuriously affect or tend . . . to affect the business
of . . . competitors." FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647-49 (1931) (Raladam I).
119. See Guidelines for the Issuance of Export Trade Certificates of Review, 48 Fed.
Reg. 15,937, 15,939 (1983). An authoritative person has said that the "Guidelines reject the
argument that Title III applications or certificates are subject to the broad interpretation of
unfair competition under section 5 of the FTC Act." Address by Marguiles, supra note 16, at
14. The Guidelines tender "deliberate and unreasonable restriction of domestic export competitors from their source of supply" as an example of an unfair method of competition cognizable
in the administrative process. 48 Fed. Reg. 15,937, 15,939 (1983). Two things occur to the
authors. First, despite the quoted rejection, the administrators will not rule on motions to dismiss privately asserted causes of action. Second, Justice Brandeis long ago warned against
confusing "unfair competition" with FTCA's address to "unfair methods of competition." FTC
v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 441-42 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). It is often remarked that
Brandeis was involved in designing the FTCA. In any event, his views concerning "unfair
methods of competition" became dominant in FTC v. Keppel, 291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934).
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It is hard to assess whether courts considering private Title III
causes of action will defer to the presumed expertise of ETCA administrators, rather than FTCA administrators. FTCA precedent is
provided by quasi-judicial and judicial proceedings, whereas the
views of ETCA administrators do not achieve such dignity. On the
other hand, there is the explicit statutory presumption that conduct
complying with a COR is in compliance with the eligibility standards.120 It would seem that, if ETCA administrators' tendency to
ignore FTCA precedent is affirmed through the appellate process,
plaintiffs' chances to rebut the presumption of conformance with
ETCA section 303(a)(3) will be considerably improved.
The authors consider that Congress achieved an interesting
trade-off. Commerce and DOJ must deal with applications for
CORs. While the administrators are to use their accumulated expertise, they are not required to preclude all possibilities that conduct
ultimately specified in a COR might inflict competitive injury. On
the face of the matter, the eligibility standards are central to the
COR issuance process rather than the federal and state rules against
which the shield may be invoked. If it is permissible to look beyond
the eligibility standards (a proposition not at all clear to the authors), it must be remembered that-at one stage-Congress contemplated that a COR "shall" issue unless conduct described by the
applicant "is likely to violate the antitrust laws.' 12 1 The very point
of providing a private cause of action is recognition that conduct germane to promoting exports which is unexceptional prima facie may
come to transgress one or more of the eligibility standards. Congress
neither forced Commerce and DOJ to exclude activities with anticompetitive potencies nor left those actually prejudiced without a
remedy. In this context, Congress' first explicit provision of a private
cause of action for "unfair methods of competition"' 2 made a lot of
sense.
The net effect is that, if certified conduct comes to violate an
eligibility standard, an injured Americanized party has a right of
action whether or not the administrators should or could have foreseen the untoward effect. In the event plaintiff is successful, the
COR is not thereby invalidated. ETCA section 306(b) defines the
120. 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(3) (1982).
121. H.R. Rep. No. 637 (11), 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 15-16 (1982) (emphasis supplied),
reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2452-53. The ultimate Conference Report
lacked such language.
122. Note that private parties do not enjoy an explicit cause of action under FTCA § 5.
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982). While one District Court inferred existence of a supposedly implied
cause of action, it is unlikely that other courts will follow suit. See generally Maher, Implied
Rights of Action . . . A Historical Perspective, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 783 (1980), reprinted in 23 CORP. PRACT. COMMENTATOR 574 (1982).
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legal and equitable remedies which are available.123 While an injunction may issue upon petition of a private party, it appears that normal rules apply and that the decree can address only implicated conduct rather than respondent's ability otherwise to rely on the COR.
On the pragmatic level, the principal benefit of a COR is a
shield against penal and punitive damage claims otherwise implicit
in openly engaging in export conduct easily characterized as offensive per se to section 1 of the Sherman Act. Profninent but nonetheless incidental benefits are protection of exporting associations or
joint ventures from attack under section 7 of the Clayton Act and
against (what may be unanticipated) consequences of violating state
laws preempted by CORs. While the shield against FTC prosecution
of "unfair methods of competition" may be meaningful during the
Reagan Administration, Brown Shoe IP 24 and S&H 2 5 are still on
the books. Therefore, if recent congressional pressures on FTC
abate, future commissioners may be tempted to pursue "unfair ...
acts or practices" affecting export commerce despite existence of a
pertinent COR. Other than such an "unfair methods" cause of action, exposure of a COR holder to single damages and injunctions
for violation of eligibility standards does not seem ominous for those
exporters who are willing to police their own conduct.
III.

The Early CORS

Through November 30, 1984, forty-six applications had been
reported and forty-six CORs had been issued. Title II trading companies are not notable among the COR applicants. This suggests
that banks' original approaches to Title II trading companies look
purely and simply to expediting regional exports. Most applicants
seem to be small entrepreneurs which export others' goods rather
than goods produced by the applicants. Surprisingly, relatively few
applicants have been groups of competitors, and relatively few applications seem to specify conduct actually requiring protection of a
COR.
Published summaries of certified export activities and methods
of operations are remarkable for frequent detailing of intended activities which are not ordinarily offensive to antitrust norms, much less
offensive per se to the Sherman Act. While some address price stabilization and export market allocations, such projections are not a
universal theme. There is much detailing of exclusive purchasing and
distribution agreements without necessary reference to foreclosure of
market shares. There are some combinations of identified competi123.
124.
125.

15 U.S.C. § 4016(b) (1982).
384 U.S. 316 (1966).
405 U.S. 233 (1972).
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tors. There are some organizational techniques which foreclose nonmembers from participation. There is some reaching "inshore" to include such activities as consulting, warehousing, insurance, and
freight forwarding.
One of the earliest recipients of a COR was U.S. Farm-Raised
1 26
Its application 1 27
Fish Trading Company, Inc. (Fish Trading).
represented one of the best efforts to take maximum advantage of
the COR mechanism. Five "members" who intended to benefit from
the COR128 were identified along with the applicant. The members
are either processors or representatives of processors of farm-raised
fish, with particular but not exclusive emphasis on catfish. The application contemplated agreements whereby the processors' export sales
would be exclusively through the newly-established trading company.
While applicant stated an intention to solicit and receive bids to fill
available foreign orders, it reserved the right to rotate solicitations
among members. Review of the published summary of application
can evoke fond memories of the mechanism scrutinized in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States.129 The ultimate COR explicitly acknowledged that the applicant trading company not only "will set
purchase prices and allocate export orders among its member processors," using either a "sealed bid procedure or a rotating bid system,"
but "will set export prices" in a context in which member processors
can agree to restrict their export sales to those accomplished through
the trading company. Interestingly, the COR also deals with a firstrefusal mechanism attendant upon a member's withdrawal. 30 In any
event, the Fish Trading COR shields a horizontal combination which
can fix domestic purchase and export resale prices as well as allocate
both suppliers and customers. It would seem that the Fish Trading
COR is very much along the lines contemplated by Congress.
The first COR is also of interest. It was obtained by a sporting
goods exporter known as International Marketing and Procurement
Services, Inc. (IMPS).' 3 ' No additional "members" were named.
The COR contemplates that IMPS will negotiate exclusives with unnamed domestic suppliers pursuant to which IMPS may obtain
power to set prices and quality limits in defined export markets as
126. 48 Fed. Reg. 50,383, 50,385 (1983) (Summary of Certificate).
127. Application No. 83-00004, 48 Fed. Reg. 29,034 (1983) (Summary of Application).
128. 48 Fed. Reg. 10,596, 10,600 (1983) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 325.2(k)).
129. 288 U.S. 244 (1933). Formed by 137 producers of bituminous coal in an economically distressed four-state area, Appalachian Coals was designated as each of the producers'
substantially exclusive agent to market coal at the best prices obtainable. The "agent" was to
set prices in the spot and near-term markets and, assuming an excessive supply, to allocate
orders among its "principals." Sales for delivery sixty or more days after commitment required
affected producers' consent to prices inter alia.
130. 48 Fed. Reg. 50,385 (1983).
131. Application No. 83-00002, 48 Fed. Reg. 29,034 (1983) (Summary of Application);
48 Fed. Reg. 50,383, 50,384-85 (1983) (Summary of Certificate).
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well as to allocate export territories or customers among its competing suppliers. On the face of the matter, the unnamed suppliers
are not insulated by the COR. On the other hand, the contractual
restraints to which they are likely to become subject are prima facie
vertical and, in any event, attack on them probably would flounder in
the shoals of Title IV. Essentially, individual suppliers would agree
only to restrain themselves as the price of obtaining representation
by IMPS which is possessed of expertise lacked by the suppliers.
A curious COR was obtained by a group quite possibly beyond
Congress' contemplation. United Export Trading Association
(UETA) applied for itself and eight "members."' 3 2 The members
operate "duty-free" shops on the northside of the United StatesMexico border. Items of export cited in the application are tax-free
and duty-free alcoholic beverages and tobacco products. UETA's
COR 1 33 contemplates that it can act not only as exclusive purchasing
agent for its members but also set resale prices, quantity, and hours
of operation for the members. While UETA also has the ability to
allocate customers and territories, the authors doubt that such authority is essential in the context of a relatively regulated industry.
Of greater significance to potential COR applicants is a relatively
liberal approach to competitive data exchange among members.
DOJ personalities have indicated great concern about price-sensitive data exchanges among persons otherwise competitors in the
context of applications for CORs.13 It is almost as though they regard United States v. Container Corporation135 as having characterized such exchanges as offensive per se.'1 6 While it is easy to point
out that perfect competition models presuppose equal access to data,
this admittedly is insufficient to exorcise the spectres implicit and
132. Application No. 83-00023, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,603 (1983) (Summary of Application).
133. 49 Fed. Reg. 7135-37 (1984).
134. See, e.g., Address by Craig W. Conrath, before a Pa. Bar Institute on ETCA, 7-11
(Nov. 2, 1983) (copy on file with the Dickinson Journal of InternationalLaw). This sensitivity
translates into clauses qualifying CORs, presumably pursuant to authority explicit in ETCA §
303(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 4013(b)(3) (1982). Typical language is as follows: The holder, "in
engaging in the certified conduct, will not intentionally disclose, directly or indirectly, to any
Supplier or prospective Supplier of similar or substitutable [goods] and Services any business
information obtained from any other Supplier. For purposes of this certificate, business information means costs of goods sold and general selling and administrative expenses, production,
capacity, inventories, domestic prices, domestic sales, domestic orders, terms of domestic marketing or sale, U.S. business plans, strategies or methods or any other such business information that is not materially related to the conduct of the export business of the Supplier through
[holder] unless such business information has already been made generally available to the
trade or public."
135. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
136. Justice Fortas supplied a concurrence essential to the result on the explicit understanding that the Court did not "hold that the exchange of specific information among sellers
as to prices charged to individual customers, pursuant to mutual arrangement, is a per se
violation of the Sherman Act." Id. at 338-39.
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1 37
explicit in Justice Douglas' lead opinion in Container Corporation.
Yet, it surely is interesting to contrast such DOJ expressions of concern with the permission given to a group of retailers (the commercial interface with the ultimate beneficiaries of antitrust) not only to
exchange price-related data but also to fix prices for goods sold to
consumers.
This relief given UETA links with another irony. DOJ has
taken great pains to insert the following language in CORs:

This certificate does not apply to sales to the United States Government or to any sales more than half the cost of which is
borne primarily by the United States Government. 38
This puts teeth in DOJ's desire to translate The Concentrated
Phosphate1 39 holding from the Webb-Pomerene Act140 to ETCA.
The clause places a great burden on marketers possessed of CORs.
Arguably, they must inquire as to export customers' sources of
funds. Note that the clause does not focus on a COR holder's knowledge that "more than half of the cost" is borne by Uncle Sam.
Congress' ambition was (and, presumably, is) to promote largescale export of goods and services. This contrasts rather sharply with
licensing horizontal price-fixing of cigarettes and liquor sold by dutyfree shops which already enjoy an obvious competitive edge over
other retailers. Yet, it is duty-free stores to whom data exchange
liberality is shown while industries that lack intrinsic competitive advantages are not only intimidated against data exchanges1 " (by
clauses that may obligate them to refrain from perfectly legal conduct because of a spectre of adverse domestic effect) but arguably
are required to probe into their large-scale customers' sources of
financing which may prove to be more than somewhat difficult.
IV.

Conclusion

A vital concept explicit in ETCA and implicit in its Title III is
that the time has come for American export cartelism. This is in
response to a world in which international trading does not routinely
honor the competition principles to which the United States ordinarily adheres. Despite various successful and unsuccessful attempts, it
is not America's job to reform the world. It is foolish to expect
American companies to compete in world markets on terms other
than those which govern their competitors.
The Title III mechanism is geared to permit various manifesta137.
138.
139.

See supra note 135.
Address by Marguiles, supra note 16, at 22.
393 U.S. 199 (1968).

140.

15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1982).

141.

See supra note 134.
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tions of cartelism so long as they do not prejudice domestic markets
in any real sense. The statutory fact is that conduct is eligible for
shielding although it is ordinarily offensive to the letter of various
substantive rules. That is the very point of CORs. If the COR administrators would confine themselves to examining prima facie compliance with the eligibility standards rather than generating safeguards against spectres, Congress' will and United States trade
balances are more likely to be served. DOJ would do well to recall
that one of Congress' objectives was efficiency. The United States
need not fear prejudicing an unsuspecting world. Nations that enforce anticartelism rules will not be frustrated by an American
COR. Nations that lack such enforcement can have no complaint.
Congress has spoken concerning American competition policy as it
affects exports. Congress' will is thwarted by an administrator who
seeks to block or impede issuance of a COR because the specified
conduct will offend norms other than those of the eligibility standards or because it is merely feared that combatitive export techniques will back-flow into the domestic economy. If such a back-flow
occurs, the revocation machinery is in place.
If it is asking too much to have the Foreign Commerce Section
of the Antitrust Division satisfy itself with prima facie compliance of
applicants, it is not difficult for the Attorney General to create a
function relieved from the disability of viewing the world from a
prosecutor's perspective. Consider, for example, the "Phosphates
Clause."14 2 If Congress wished the Concentrated Phosphatesholding
to apply despite a COR, it could have so provided. Provision of the
eligibility standards satisfied Congress. It did not assign an oversight
role to DOJ. Neither did DOJ acquire rule-making authority analogous to that of FTC. Why, then, should DOJ strive so to insure that
the Concentrated Phosphates doctrine, properly germane only to
Webb-Pomerene associations, 4 ' is incorporated into CORs? Are
there other ground rules that DOJ personnel think Congress should
have adopted? While it is easy to understand and even to praise
zealous protection of the nation, this cannot go so far as to welcome
arrogation of power.

142.
143.

See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 139-40.

